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The Leave campaign in the U.K., which advocated exiting the European Union,
emphasized anxiety over immigration and the need to take control of the U.K.’s borders.
Citizens who expressed concerns about immigration to the U.K. were more likely to
vote to leave. Two correlational studies examined the previously unexplored question
of whether the Brexit vote and support for the outcome of the E.U. referendum were
linked to individual predictors of prejudice toward foreigners: British collective narcissism
(a belief in national greatness), right wing authoritarianism, and social dominance
orientation. The results converged to indicate that all three variables were independently
related to the perceived threat of immigrants and, via this variable, to the Brexit vote
and a support for the outcome of the E.U. referendum. These variables explained the
variance in the perceived threat of immigrants and support for the Brexit vote over and
above other previously examined predictors such as age, education, or ethnicity, as well
as, national identification and national attachment.
Keywords: Brexit vote, immigration threat, collective narcissism, right wing authoritarianism, social dominance
orientation
INTRODUCTION
On June 23, 2016 almost 52% of British citizens who participated in the European Union (E.U.)
referendum in the United Kingdom voted to leave. Individual level explanations that followed this
largely unexpected result pointed to the role of voter’s age and ethnicity, their cost-benefit and
risk calculations, susceptibility to influence political elites and low feelings of attachment to the
wider international community (Clarke et al., 2016). Several explanations suggested that the Leave
campaign might have mobilized xenophobic attitudes by emphasizing fear of foreigners and the
need to take control of the U.K.’s borders to limit free movement of E.U. nationals. In this vein,
survey results suggested that those respondents who expressed concerns about immigration to the
U.K. were more likely to vote Leave (Hobolt, 2016).
Was the Brexit vote related to xenophobia? To answer this question the present studies examined
whether the Brexit vote and support for the referendum’s outcome were linked to feeling threatened
by immigrants and foreigners and whether they were more likely among people already prone to
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prejudice. More specifically, we examined whether collective
narcissist (i.e., individuals who believe in their nation’s
unparalleled greatness, Golec de Zavala et al., 2009),
authoritarians (those who obey authority and social conventions
and reject dissenters, Altemeyer, 1988) and people high in social
dominance orientation (those who want to maintain group based
hierarchies, Pratto et al., 1994) were more likely to vote to leave
the E.U. because they felt threatened by immigrants.
Although, right wing authoritarianism and social dominance
orientation have been already implicated in voting for radical
right wing parties because of the perceived threat of immigrants
(Aichholzer and Zandonella, 2016), collective narcissism has
almost never been examined in the context of political behaviors
such as voting. However, multiple studies indicate that collective
narcissism predicts rejection of outgroups more systematically
than national identification (i.e., considering one’s own national
identity as important and central to the self) or national
attachment (i.e., feeling love for and pride of one’s own
nation) (Mummendey et al., 2001; Herrmann et al., 2009;
see also Roccas et al., 2006). Moreover, although research
demonstrated that collective narcissism predicts rejection of
outgroups independently of right wing authoritarianism and
social dominance orientation (for review see, Golec de Zavala,
in press), no previous studies examined whether the three
variables explain attitudes toward the superordinate group that
would undermine the strength of the boundaries between the
national ingroup and outgroups, i.e., the European Union.
COLLECTIVE NARCISSISM AND
PERCEIVED IMMIGRATION THREAT
Previous studies have linked British national identification
and attachment to unfavorable attitudes toward immigration
to the U.K. and toward the E.U. (Carrey, 2002; Cinnirella
and Hamilton, 2007). However, a closer examination of these
relationships is desirable in light of the findings that the
average association between ingroup identification (Pehrson
et al., 2009) or positive ingroup attachment (Leach et al., 2008)
and rejection of outgroups is close to zero (Rubin and Hewstone,
1998). Instead, psychological research has differentiated between
positive national attitudes that are more likely to be linked to
outgroup derogation (e.g., blind or conventional patriotism) and
those that are not (e.g., constructive patriotism, national ingroup
satisfaction, Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989; Schatz et al., 1999;
Leach et al., 2008; Sekerdej and Roccas, 2016).
Collective narcissism is a form of a positive ingroup attitude
that, when applied to a nation, is systematically related to
rejection of foreigners and national and ethnic minorities
(Cai and Gries, 2013; Lyons et al., 2013; Cichocka, 2016;
Golec de Zavala, in press). People who score high on the
Collective Narcissism Scale (i.e., collective narcissists) endorse
the view that their nation’s importance and true worth is
not sufficiently recognized by others, concur that their nation
“deserves special treatment,” and expect that their nation receives
its due acknowledgement and respect (Golec de Zavala et al.,
2009; Golec de Zavala, in press). Collective narcissism is related
to direct and indirect retaliatory hostility in response to real or
imagined offenses to the ingroup (Golec de Zavala et al., 2013a,
2016). Collective narcissistic prejudice and rejection of outgroups
is driven by a belief that the targeted outgroups threatened the
ingroup’s safety (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009; Golec de Zavala
and Cichocka, 2012) or its narrowly defined “purity” (Gries et al.,
2008).
Collective narcissism explains the rejection of outgroups even
after controlling for levels of national identification or national
attachment. After their links with collective narcissism are
controlled for, national identification and national attachment
cease to explain outgroup rejection in the context of intergroup
threat (with the exception of one study showing an independent
relation between outgroup rejection and blind patriotism
mediated by the perceived threat after controlling for collective
narcissism, Golec de Zavala et al., 2013b, 2016). Given such
findings, we expected that collective narcissism might predict
political behaviors such as support for anti-immigrant policies,
voting for political parties that support such politics or, as in
the case of the E.U. referendum, choosing to leave the E.U.
However, collective narcissism has not been frequently examined
in the context of political behaviors, despite the above evidence
suggesting that it may predict voting at least as much as
right wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation
whose implications for political behaviors were studied more
frequently.
One of the few studies that examined the implications of
collective narcissism in the context of voting showed that
collective narcissism predicted voting for Donald Trump in 2016
Presidential election in the U.S. independently of demographic
variables, authoritarianism, and national identification. Thus,
collective narcissism predicted support for the political candidate
whose campaign emphasized alleged threat to the country’s
unique and privileged position (“America first” or “Make
America great again”) and who advocated anti-immigrant
policies (Federico and Golec de Zavala, 2017). Such findings
suggest that collective narcissists may be mobilized by political
rhetoric emphasizing threatened national uniqueness. Since the
Leave campaign heavily relied on such rhetoric, we expected that
British collective narcissism would predict the Brexit vote via the
perception of immigrants in the UK as threatening.
There are other reasons to expect that collective
narcissists may perceive immigrants as threatening. First,
immigrants’ foreign values and customs may undermine the
“purity” of British identity (Gries et al., 2008). In addition,
misunderstandings that are frequent in interactions between
nationals of different countriesmay seem particularly aggravating
to collective narcissists. Collective narcissism has been linked
to a tendency to perceive ambiguous intergroup situations as
intentional offenses to the ingroup, to which collective narcissists
react aggressively (Golec de Zavala et al., 2016). Immigrants
and foreign workers who fair better than host country nationals
pose a threat of unfavorable intergroup comparisons that may
undermine perceived superiority of the host group (Esses
et al., 2013; Murray and Marx, 2013). Such comparisons are
aversive to collective narcissists sensitivity to threats to the
ingroup’s image. Collective narcissism predicts hostile responses
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to such perceived threats (Golec de Zavala, in press). Finally,
the expectation that collective narcissism predicts the perceived
threat of immigrants is in line with the Intergroup Emotions
Theory which posits that group-based emotions arise when
people appraise the implications of intergroup situations in
terms of their implication for the ingroup (Smith and Mackie,
2015). The results reviewed above indicate that collective
narcissists are likely to appraise immigrants as a threat to their
ingroup and react to them with negative, hostile, emotions. Such
group-based hostility might have been expressed in the Brexit
vote. A post-referendum increase in the narrative about national
uniqueness and superiority, on the one hand, and in hate speech
and discrimination against foreigners in the U.K., on the other
hand, offered anecdotal support for this expectation (Forster,
2016).
COLLECTIVE NARCISSISM, RIGHT WING
AUTHORITARIANISM, SOCIAL
DOMINANCE ORIENTATION AND
PREJUDICE
Apart from the threat to the national ingroup image, the Leave
campaign brought up other issues that might have linked the
perceived threat of immigration to the U.K. with two correlates
of collective narcissism and robust predictors of prejudice: right
wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1988) and social dominance
orientation (Pratto et al., 1994; for their links to prejudice see,
Whitley, 1999; Ekehammar et al., 2004; Dru, 2007; Duckitt and
Sibley, 2007; Asbrock et al., 2010).
Research indicated that the links between right wing
authoritarianism and social dominance orientation and prejudice
are additive rather than interactive: the two variables predict
prejudice independently and for different reasons (Ekehammar
et al., 2004; Sibley et al., 2007a,b). Right wing authoritarianism,
which has been indirectly implicated in the Brexit vote
(Kaufman, 2016), is a three-faceted attitude syndrome combining
submission to strength-based authority, aggressiveness toward
social deviants and dissenters, support for conventionalism,
order and a non-diverse environment (Altemeyer, 1988). It is
related to a belief that the world is a dangerous place. Thus, right
wing authoritarianism is related to prejudice toward those social
groups that appear to threaten the traditional status quo (Duckitt,
2006; Duckitt and Sibley, 2007).
In this vein, research has linked right wing authoritarianism
with hostile responses to social threats (Lavine et al., 1999;
Hibbing et al., 2014), political conservatism (Jost et al., 2003;
Duckitt et al., 2010), and more specifically, to voting for right
wing political parties and candidates advocating rejection of
immigrants in Europe (Aichholzer and Zandonella, 2016), in
the U.S. (Crawford et al., 2013; MacWilliams, 2016; Choma and
Hanoch, 2017; Crowson and Brandes, 2017), or in Latin America
(Cohen and Smith, 2016). The Leave campaign emphasized the
economic threat that immigrants pose to British nationals. In
addition, it framed the principles pursued by the E.U. as not
complying with traditional British values. Such framing might
have mobilized people high in right wing authoritarianism to
reject immigrants and to vote to leave the E.U. in order to protect
the traditional social order.
Social dominance orientation refers to individual degree of
preference for group-based hierarchies (Pratto et al., 1994).
It is related to the belief that the world is a “competitive
jungle,” where groups need to fight for superiority. Thus,
social dominance orientation is related to prejudice toward
groups threatening the ingroup’s status (Duckitt, 2006). Indeed,
previous studies have linked social dominance orientation with
anti-egalitarian, anti-immigrant attitudes (Sidanius et al., 2000;
Kteily et al., 2017), political conservatism (Ho et al., 2012),
and voting for radical, right wing political parties advocating
maintenance of group-based social hierarchies (Cornelis and
Van Hiel, 2015; Aichholzer and Zandonella, 2016). The Leave
campaign alluded to the U.K.’s subsidiary role in the E.U.
(Elliott, 2016). Such allusions might have mobilized people high
in social dominance to vote to leave the E.U. to compete for
higher international status. Individuals high in social dominance
orientation might also have been mobilized to reject immigrants
who fare well in the U.K., thus posing a status threat to British
nationals.
Thus, it is likely that the Brexit vote was an expression of
hostility toward immigrants in response to different concerns
that immigration raised for collective narcissists, authoritarians,
and people high in social dominance orientation. More
specifically, the perceived threat of immigrants was likely to
be motivated by the collective narcissistic concern regarding
threaten national uniqueness, authoritarian concern about
maintaining the normative status quo, and the concern regarding
the protection of the elevated international status related to social
dominance orientation.
THE PRESENT STUDIES
The present studies tested the hypothesis that collective
narcissism, right wing authoritarianism and social dominance
orientation independently predicted the Brexit vote and a
support for the outcome of the E.U. referendum because they
independently predicted the perceived threat of immigrants. As
such, these are the first studies to compare the relationships of
the three robust predictors of prejudice with attitudes toward
immigrants and the E.U. in the U.K.. We hypothesized
that collective narcissism, right wing authoritarianism
and social dominance orientation remain related to the
perceived threat of immigrants and the Brexit vote after
participants’ age, gender, education, ethnicity, reported
national group and national ingroup identification (Study
1) and national attachment (Study 2) are accounted for.
Previous studies indicate that neither ingroup identification
nor ingroup attachment is positively related to outgroup
rejection after collective narcissism is controlled for (Golec
de Zavala et al., 2016). Thus, Study 1 looked at the role of
collective narcissism as compared to national identification
and Study 2 compared collective narcissism and national
attachment as predictors of the perceived threat of immigrants,
the referendum vote and support for the referendum’s
outcome.
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STUDY 1
Study 1 was conducted in July 2016 just after the E.U. referendum
in the U.K. It tested whether collective narcissism, right wing
authoritarianism and social dominance orientation were related
to the Brexit vote and a support for the referendum’s outcome
because of their unique relationships with the perceived threat
of immigrants. Study 1 also tested whether the link between
collective narcissism and the Brexit vote was specific to collective
narcissism and not explained by the strength of national
identification.
Participants
Study 1 was conducted online online using the Qualtrics platform
via the Prolific Academic research panel (www.prolific.ac) among
280 British citizens who voted in the European referendum, of
whom 194 reported voting to remain. We obtained a sample of
285 participants but 5 participants did not meet the participation
criterion (having voted in the referendum). Their data was not
taken into account in the analyses. Themean age of the remaining
280 participants was 34.58 (SD = 12.94), 184 of the respondents
were women. One hundred and fifty-one participants reported
their nationality as English, 2 as Scottish, 15 Welsh, 90 British,
17U.K., 5 as Other. The sample size was set to be over
250 participants based on research suggesting that correlations
stabilize at more or less this number of participants (Schönbrodt
and Perugini, 2013). All participants were paid a small fee in
exchange for their participation.
Procedure
Participants were told that the study examined attitudes toward
the E.U. in relation to national attitudes and personality. After
reading the informed consent form and consenting by clicking
the “By clicking here you give your consent to participate in
this study” button, participants could proceed to the study.
They were first asked to provide their demographic data.
Next, they responded to individual difference measurements
presented in random order to each participant. The order of
items was also randomized. Then, participants were thanked,
paid, and debriefed. In both studies data collection ceased on a
predetermined date and data were not observed prior to analyses.
Measurements
Study 1 controlled for participants’ age, gender (0 = “Male,” 1
= “Female”), education, ethnicity (0 = “Black” or “Asian” or
“Other,” 1= “White”) and reported national group (0= “English”
or “Welsh” or “Scottish” or “Irish,” 1= “British” or “U.K.”).
Collective narcissism
Collective narcissism was measured using the 5-item Collective
Narcissism Scale (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009, 2013b, i.e., “My
national group deserves special treatment,” “I will never be satisfied
until my national group gets all it deserves,” “It really makes me
angry when others criticize my national group,” “If my national
group had a major say in the world, the world would be a
much better place,” “Not many people seem to fully understand
the importance of my national group,” α = 0.87). Items were
answered on scales from “1” = “I strongly disagree” to “6” = “I
strongly agree.”
Right wing authoritarianism
Right wing authoritarianism was measured by a 10-item version
of the Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (Zakrisson, 2005, e.g.,
“Obedience and respect for authority are the most important
virtues children should learn,” α = 0.78). Items were answered on
scales from “1”= “I strongly disagree” to “7”= “I strongly agree.”
Social-dominance orientation
Social-dominance orientation was measured by a 4-item version
of the Social Dominance Orientation Scale (Pratto et al., 2013,
e.g., “We should not push for group equality,” reversely coded, α
= 0.82). Items were answered on scales from “1” = “I strongly
disagree” to “7”= “I strongly agree.”
National identification
National identification was measured by the Centrality subscale
of the Social Identity Scale proposed by Cameron (2004, e.g.,
“Being from my national group is an important reflection of what I
am.,” “Being from my national group is not important for how
I think of what type of person I am.,” “I have a strong feeling
of belonging to my national group.,” “In general, being from my
national group has little to do with the way I feel about myself.,”
“Being from my national group is not a central factor of my
social relations,” “In general, being from my national group is an
important part ofmy self-image.,” α= 0.87). Items were answered
on scales from “1” = “I strongly disagree” to “7” = “I strongly
agree.”
Perceived threat of immigrants in the U.K.
Perceived threat of immigrants in the U.K. was measured by
10 items asking to what extent immigrants pose a realistic
and symbolic threat to the U.K. Specifically, participants were
asked to what extent they agreed that immigrants and foreign
workers “threaten our jobs and economic opportunities”; “threaten
our personal possessions”; “threaten our personal rights and
freedoms”; “violate reciprocity relations by choice”; “threaten our
social coordination and functioning”; “violate our trust”; “threaten
our physical health”; “hold values inconsistent with those of
my national group”; “endanger our physical safety”; “violate
reciprocity relations because of a lack of ability” (Cottrell and
Neuberg, 2005, α= 0.95). Items were answered on scales from “1”
= “I strongly disagree” to “7” = “I strongly agree.” The principal
component factor analysis resulted in one factor solution with
factor loading of 8.16. Items loadings ranged from 0.66 to 92.
Thus, the items were averaged to form one index of the perceived
threat of immigrants to the U.K.
Brexit vote
Brexit vote was measured by asking participants how they voted
in the E.U. referendum: “How did you vote in the European
referendum on 26th of June?” (0= “Remain”; 1= “Leave”).
Support for the referendum’s outcome
Support for the referendum’s outcome was measured by
the question: “To what extent do you feel . . . about the
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outcome of the European referendum?” Following emotions
were assessed: “happy”; “disappointed”; “proud”; “shocked”;
“frightened”; “disgusted”; “unhappy”; “thrilled”; and “worried.”
Positive and reversed negative emotion formed a reliable scale,
α = 0.94. Items were answered on scales from “1” = “Not at all”
to “5”= “Very much so.”
Results
Predictors of Prejudice and the Referendum Vote via
the Perceived Threat of Immigrants
The results in Table 1 show that all continuous variables in
Study 1 were positively correlated. In order to test the hypothesis
that collective narcissism, right wing authoritarianism and social
dominance orientation were related to the referendum vote
because they were associated with the perceived threat of
immigrants, we first performed multiple mediation analyses in a
multiple regression context with the self-reported vote in the E.U.
referendum as a binary outcome variable using PROCESS (Model
4, Hayes, 2013). The macro estimates the direct and indirect
effects, as well as the path from the proposed mediator to the
outcome using logistic regression. Logistic regression coefficients
are estimated using a Newton–Raphson iteration algorithm.
Regression path coefficients for the dichotomous outcome are the
maximum-likelihood-based logistic regression coefficients or the
log odds ratios. The confidence intervals are associated with the
Wald test (Z-value).
In order to estimate the direct and indirect effects of all
variables we ran the multiple mediation analysis three times,
each time with a different variable as a predictor in the
model (a model for each predictor: collective narcissism, right
wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation), the
perceived threat of immigrants as a mediator, the referendum
vote as the outcome variable and the remaining variables
as covariates. Mathematically, all resulting paths, direct and
indirect effects, are the same as if they were estimated
simultaneously (Hayes, 2013) (Table 2, Figure 1). This analysis
allowed us to test the hypothesis that collective narcissism,
right wing authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation
independently predict the Brexit vote via the perception of
immigrants as threatening. We ran the analyses without
demographic covariates first. Next, the analyses controlled for
participants’ age, gender, education, ethnicity, and national
identification in order to demonstrate that collective narcissism,
right wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation
accounted for a unique portion of variance in the referendum
vote. Finally, in order to compare the relative contribution of
collective narcissism and national identification to explaining
the variance in the perceived threat of immigrants and the
Brexit vote, we performed the same multiple mediation analysis
with national identification as a predictor instead of collective
narcissism, first without controlling for the overlap between
the two variables (but controlling for the overlap with right
wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation), next
entering collective narcissism as a covariate, and finally including
all covariates (results of the latter analysis are presented in
Table 2, Figure 1). All predictors were mean centered prior to
the analyses. We used the default bootstrapping with 10,000
samples in all analyses to construct the confidence intervals for
the observed effects.
The model we tested first, with collective narcissism,
right wing authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation
independently predicting the perceived threat of immigrants
and the Brexit vote, was significant, RCS
2
= 0.35 (0.50
Nagelkerke), χ2
(1)
= 223.59, p < 0.001. Collective narcissism,
right wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation
were independently, positively related to the perceived threat
of immigrants. The indirect relationships between collective
narcissism, right wing authoritarianism and social dominance
orientation via the perceived threat of immigrants were
significant. Adding covariates to the analyses did not change the
pattern of the results (Table 2, Figure 1).
In order to assess the role of national identification, we
first ran the mediation model with national identification
as a predictor instead of collective narcissism (adding right
wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation as
covariates). The whole model was significant, RCS
2
= 0.35 (0.49
Nagelkerke), χ2
(1)
= 225.64, p < 0.001. However, the direct effect
and indirect effects of national identification were not significant,
b= 0.20, SE= 0.15, z = 1.29, p= 0.20, 95%CI [−0.10; 0.50] and
IE = 0.11, SE = 0.07, 95%CI [−0.01; 0.25], z = 1.61, p = 0.11,
respectively. When collective narcissism and other covariates
were entered into the equation the direct and indirect effects of
national identification were reduced but the overall pattern of
relationships remained unchanged (Table 2).
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics and correlations for the measurements of Study 1, N = 280.
Variables Mean SD Correlations
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
1. Collective narcissism 2.62 1.14 —
2. National identity 3.64 1.28 0.44*** —
3. Social dominance orientation 2.21 1.08 0.32*** 0.24*** —
4. Right-wing authoritarianism 3.03 0.98 0.58*** 0.39*** 0.38*** —
5. Perceived threat of immigrants 2.32 1.28 0.60*** 0.33*** 0.52*** 0.59*** —
6. Support for the outcome 3.70 1.18 0.50*** 0.30*** 0.34*** 0.45*** 0.65***
***p < 0.001.
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TABLE 2 | Direct and indirect effects of all variables on the Brexit vote and support for the referendum’s outcome, Study 1 and 2.
Direct effect Indirect effect
Coefficient SE p Coefficient SE 95% CI Z p
STUDY 1, BREXIT VOTE (WITHOUT COVARIATES)
Collective narcissism 0.33 0.20 0.10 0.49 0.13 [0.28; 0.75] 4.40 <0.001
Right wing authoritarianism 0.07 0.24 0.76 0.45 0.15 [0.21; 0.77] 3.87 <0.001
Social dominance orientation −0.17 0.19 0.36 0.47 0.14 [0.25; 0.77] 4.54 <0.001
National identity 0.13 0.16 0.41 −0.004 0.06 [−0.13; 0.11] −0.06 0.95
STUDY 1, BREXIT VOTE (WITH COVARIATES)
Collective narcissism 0.37 0.22 0.09 0.42 0.13 [0.21; 0.68] 3.96 <0.001
Right wing authoritarianism −0.02 0.25 0.95 0.36 0.14 [0.15; 0.68] 3.39 <0.001
Social dominance orientation −0.11 0.20 0.56 0.43 0.14 [0.21; 0.73] 4.18 <0.001
National identity 0.15 0.17 0.37 0.002 0.06 [−0.12; 0.11] 0.03 0.97
STUDY 1, SUPPORT FOR THE REFERENDUM’S OUTCOME (WITHOUT COVARIATES)
Collective narcissism 0.15 0.06 0.03 0.19 0.04 [0.12; 0.28] 5.04 <0.001
Right wing authoritarianism 0.04 0.07 0.54 0.17 0.05 [0.09; 0.28] 4.29 <0.001
Social dominance orientation −0.02 0.06 0.79 0.18 0.04 [0.11; 0.28] 5.26 <0.001
National identity 0.05 0.05 0.29 −0.002 0.02 [−0.05; 0.04] −0.06 0.95
STUDY 1, SUPPORT FOR THE REFERENDUM’S OUTCOME (WITH COVARIATES)
Collective narcissism 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.16 0.04 [0.10; 0.25] 4.62 <0.001
Right wing authoritarianism 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.04 [0.07; 0.23] 3.79 <0.001
Social dominance orientation −0.03 0.06 0.64 0.16 0.04 [0.10; 0.25] 4.98 <0.001
National identity 0.06 0.05 0.23 0.001 0.02 [−0.04; 0.04] 0.03 0.97
STUDY 2, BREXIT VOTE (WITHOUT COVARIATES)
Collective narcissism 0.12 0.22 0.58 0.42 0.13 [0.20; 0.70] 3.69 0.002
Right wing authoritarianism 0.21 0.23 0.36 0.26 0.12 [0.07; 0.52] 2.59 0.010
Social dominance orientation −0.08 0.20 0.69 0.28 0.11 [0.10; 0.51] 2.99 0.003
National attachment −0.001 0.18 1.00 0.08 0.07 [−0.04; 0.21] 1.16 0.24
STUDY 2, BREXIT VOTE (WITH COVARIATES)
Collective narcissism 0.13 0.22 0.56 0.38 0.13 [0.17; 0.65] 3.53 0.004
Right wing authoritarianism 0.17 0.24 0.49 0.19 0.12 [−0.004; 0.45] 2.05 0.04
Social dominance orientation −0.08 0.21 0.72 0.28 0.11 [0.11; 0.51] 2.98 0.003
National attachment 0.003 0.19 0.99 0.07 0.07 [−0.05; 0.21] 1.15 0.25
STUDY 2, SUPPORT FOR THE REFERENDUM’S OUTCOME (WITHOUT COVARIATES)
Collective narcissism −0.03 0.08 0.68 0.22 0.05 [0.12; 0.33] 4.42 <0.001
Right wing authoritarianism 0.07 0.08 0.40 0.14 0.06 [0.04; 0.26] 2.83 0.005
Social dominance orientation 0.05 0.07 0.46 0.15 0.05 [0.06; 0.25] 3.36 <0.001
National attachment 0.03 0.06 0.56 0.04 0.03 [−0.02; 0.10] 1.19 0.23
STUDY 2, SUPPORT FOR THE REFERENDUM’S OUTCOME (WITH COVARIATES)
Collective narcissism −0.03 0.08 0.71 0.20 0.05 [0.11; 0.31] 4.23 <0.001
Right wing authoritarianism 0.05 0.08 0.58 0.10 0.05 [0.06; 0.21] 2.18 0.03
Social dominance orientation 0.04 0.07 0.56 0.15 0.05 [0.06; 0.25] 3.38 <0.001
National attachment 0.04 0.06 0.47 0.04 0.03 [−0.02; 0.10] 1.18 0.24
The coefficients for the binary outcome (the referendum vote) are the log odds ratios. The coefficients for the continuous outcome (support for the referendum outcome) are
unstandardized multiple regression weights.
Predictors of Prejudice and Support for the
Referendum’s Outcome via the Perceived Threat of
Immigrants
Next, we performed the same multiple mediation analysis
using support for the referendum outcome as a continuous
outcome variable. Collective narcissism, right wing
authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation were
entered as predictors, the perceived threat of immigrants as
the mediator and a support for the referendum’s outcome
as the outcome variable. The analyses were performed
three times using PROCESS (Model 4, Hayes, 2013). Next,
the analyses were performed with national identification
and demographic variables as covariates. Finally, the
analyses were performed with national identification as a
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FIGURE 1 | Relationship between variables in Study 1. Coefficients for the binary outcome variable represent log odds [odd ratios] and standard errors are in
parentheses. Coefficients for the continuous variables represent unstandardized regression weights. Numerals in italic font correspond to analyses with covariates
(national identification, age, gender, education, ethnicity, and indicated national group). Numerals in bold font correspond to unstandardized regression weights and
standard error in analyses predicting the continuous support for the outcome of the referendum. ***p < 0.001.
predictor without, and then with collective narcissism as a
covariate.
The first analysis showed that collective narcissism, right
wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation
independently indirectly predicted support for the outcome of
the referendum via the perceived threat of immigrants which
explained variance in, R2 = 0.44, F(4, 275) = 54.26, p < 0.001.
Analyses with covariates did not change the pattern of the
relationships (Table 2, Figure 1). The analyses with national
identification entered as a predictor without controlling for its
overlap with collective narcissism produced a significant model,
R2 = 0.43, F(4, 275) = 52.54, p < 0.001. The direct effect and
indirect effects of national identification were not significant,
b= 0.08, SE = 0.05, t(275) = 1.68, p = 0.09, 95%CI [−0.01; 0.17]
and IE = 0.04, SE = 0.02, 95%CI [−0.003; 0.09], z = 1.64, p =
0.10, respectively. When collective narcissism was entered as a
covariate, the direct and indirect effects of national identification
were reduced to values presented in Table 2. Especially, the
indirect effect was reduced from marginally significant to non-
significant. This pattern of results remained unchanged when
demographic covariates were also controlled.
Relative Importance of All Predictors of Prejudice for
the Perceived Threat of Immigrants and Support for
the Referendum’s Outcome
Finally, because the analyzed predictors of perceived threat
of immigrants and support for the referendum’s outcome
were correlated, relative importance indices were computed
to assess the unique contribution of each predictor in
the context of possible multicollinearity: dominance weights,
relative importance weights, and incremental R2 (Braun and
Oswald, 2011). Those indices determine the unique and
combined contribution of collective narcissism, right wing
authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and national
identification to explaining variance in the perceived threat of
immigrants and support for the referendum’s outcome.
Regression weights of strongly correlated predictors may not
give an adequate indicator of the unique contribution of each
variable because they change with covariance relationships, and
therefore may be sample-specific and not easily generalizable.
Dominance weights give a more accurate assessment of the
hierarchy of importance of the correlated predictors. General
dominance weights are computed by averaging the given
predictor’s incremental validity across all possible submodels that
involve that predictor. This analysis reduces the importance of
redundant predictors when multicollinearity is present. Relative
importance weights indicate the proportionate contribution of
each predictor to the variance explained in the outcome variable.
Incremental R2 analysis reflects the unique contribution of each
predictor after the variance accounted for by the remaining
predictors has been partialled out of the outcome. It represents
the increase in R2 when the predictor is entered last in a stepwise
fashion, indicating the unique impact of that predictor in the
model (For detailed description of the computations of each
weights please see Braun and Oswald, 2011).
The relative importance indices converged to indicate that
collective narcissism, right wing authoritarianism and social
dominance orientation independently contributed to explaining
the variance in the perceived threat of immigrants, in this
order of importance. In comparison, the national identification
contribution was decidedly minor (Table 3). In the event of
a support for the referendum’s outcome, collective narcissism,
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TABLE 3 | Comparison of relative importance of all variables in explaining variance in the perceived threat of immigrants and in support for the referendum’s outcome,
Study 1, N = 280.
Variables VIF Study 1 (perceived threat of immigrants, Overall R2 = 0.53) Study 1 (support for the outcome, Overall R2 = 0.31)
Regression
weights
Dominance
weights
Relative importance
weights
Incremental
R2
Regression
weights
Dominance
weights
Relative importance
weights
Incremental
R2
Collective narcissism 1.65 0.34 0.18 0.18 0.07 0.32 0.14 0.13 0.06
National identification 1.29 −0.002 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.002
Social dominance
orientation
1.19 0.31 0.15 0.15 0.08 0.15 0.05 0.06 0.02
Right wing
authoritarianism
1.65 0.28 0.16 0.16 0.06 0.19 0.09 0.09 0.02
and right wing authoritarianism were the main predictors,
whereas the contribution of social dominance orientation was
smaller and the contribution of national identification was
negligible.
Together, the results of Study 1 strongly suggest that
collective narcissism, right wing authoritarianism and social
dominance orientation were related to the perceived threat
of immigrants, and indirectly predicted the Brexit vote and
support for the referendum’s outcome. National identification
did not predict the perceived threat of immigrants, the
Brexit vote or support for referendum’s outcome after its
overlap with collective narcissism, right wing authoritarianism
and social dominance orientation was controlled for. We
sought to replicate those results to examine whether they
generalize to a different sample of British referendum voters.
Given the fact that all main predictors were significantly
correlated, repeated pattern of relationships in Study 2 would
increase our confidence in the replicability of our results.
In addition, in Study 2 the role of collective narcissism in
predicting the Brexit vote was compared to the role of national
attachment.
STUDY 2
Study 2 was conducted just after the U.K. government’s support
for the “hard” Brexit option was announced in September 2016.
Study 2 examined the same predictions as Study 1 and sought to
clarify that collective narcissism, rather than national attachment,
would predict the Brexit vote and support for the referendum’s
outcome via the perceived threat of immigrants.
Participants
The same criteria for the sample size were chosen as in Study 1
but the platform did not effectively filter out participants who
did not vote in the referendum. The requested sample was 251
participants but 25 participants reported not having voted in the
E.U. referendum and their data were excluded from analyses.
Out of the 226 participants who reported voting in the E.U.
referendum, 161 reported voting to remain in the E.U. The mean
age was 34.37 (SD = 11.89), 125 were women. One hundred
and thirty-four participants identified as English, 20 as Welsh,
7 as Scottish, 2 as Irish, 57 as British, 5 as U.K., and 1 as
Other.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Study 1. Participants in Study
1 could not take part in Study 2 (were defined as non-eligible in
Prolific Academic).
Measurements
Study 2 controlled for participants’ age, gender (0 = “Male,” 1
= “Female”), education, ethnicity (0 = “Black” or “Asian” or
“Other,” 1= “White”), and reported national group (0= “English”
or “Welsh” or “Scottish” or “Irish,” 1 = “British” or “U.K.”). As
in Study 1 all measures were randomly presented. Collective
narcissism, (α = 0.88), right-wing authoritarianism (α = 0.80),
social dominance orientation (α = 0.82), and the perceived
threat of immigrants in the U.K. (α = 0.97) and a support for
the referendum’s outcome (α= 93) were measured as in Study 1.
National attachment
National attachment was assessed by the ingroup satisfaction
subscale of the Ingroup Identity Scale which pertains to positive
attachment to a national group (α = 0.91; Leach et al., 2008;
e.g., “I am glad to be a member of my national group”; “I think
that members of my national group have a lot to be proud of”;
“It is pleasant to be member of my national group”; and “Being
a member of my national group gives me a good feeling”). Items
were answered on scales from “1”= “I strongly disagree” to “7”=
“I strongly agree.”
Results
Predictors of Prejudice and the Referendum Vote via
the Perceived Threat of Immigrants
All continuous variables were positively correlated (Table 4).
As in Study 1, to test whether collective narcissism, right
wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation
independently predict the Brexit vote via the perceived threat
of immigrants, multiple mediation analyses in the multiple
regression context with the self-reported vote in the E.U.
referendum as a binary outcome variable were performed three
times for each predictor separately, and the other predictors
as covariates. Next, national attachment and demographic
covariates were entered into the equation. Finally, as in Study
2, we entered national attachment as a predictor instead of
collective narcissism and run the analyses without and with
collective narcissism as a covariate.
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TABLE 4 | Descriptive statistics and correlations for the measurements of Study 2, N = 226.
Variables Mean SD Correlations
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
1. Collective narcissism 2.72 1.11 —
2. National attachement 4.72 1.24 0.47*** —
3. Social dominance orientation 2.43 1.07 0.44*** 0.21*** —
4. Right-wing authoritarianism 3.08 0.99 0.50*** 0.35*** 0.50*** —
5. Perceived threat of immigrants 2.78 1.48 0.57** 0.35*** 0.49*** 0.50*** —
6. Support for outcome 3.79 1.21 0.37*** 0.25*** 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.63***
***p < 0.001.
The analyses for the first model indicated that the wholemodel
was significant, RCS
2
= 0.28(0.40 Nagelkerke), χ2
(1)
= 196.62,
p< 0.001. The analyses indicated that collective narcissism, right
wing authoritarianism and social dominance were independently
related the Brexit vote via the perceived threat of immigrants
(Table 2, Figure 2). Overall the pattern of relationships remained
unchanged after the covariates were entered to the equation, with
the exception of right wing authoritarianism. The analyses with
national attachment as a predictor instead of collective narcissism
produced a significant model, RCS
2
= 0.27(0.40 Nagelkerke), χ2
(1)
= 196.92, p < 0.001. The direct effect of national attachment
on the referendum vote was not significant, b = 0.03, SE =
0.17, 95%CI [−0.30; 0.37], z = 0.20, p = 0.84. However, the
indirect effect via the perceived threat of immigrants was positive
and significant, IE = 0.20, SE = 0.08, 95%CI [0.07; 0.39], z =
2.75, p = 0.006. When collective narcissism was entered as a
covariate this effect became non-significant, IE= 0.08, SE= 0.07,
95%CI [−0.04; 0.21], z = 1.16, p = 0.24. This pattern remained
unchanged after the demographic covariates were also entered
into the equation (Table 2).
Predictors of Prejudice and Support for the
Referendum’s Outcome via the Perceived Threat of
Immigrants
Next, we performed the same multiple mediation analysis using
support for the referendum outcome as a continuous outcome
variable. Collective narcissism, right wing authoritarianism, and
social dominance orientation were entered as predictors, the
perceived threat of immigrants as the mediator and a support
for the referendum’s outcome as the outcome variable. The
analyses were performed three times using PROCESS (Model 4,
Hayes, 2013). Next, the analyses were performed with national
attachment and demographic variables as covariates. Finally, the
analyses were performed with national attachment as a predictor
instead of collective narcissism, first without and then with
collective narcissism as a covariate.
The first set of analyses produced a significant model, R2
= 0.40, F(4, 221) = 37.83, p < 0.001. The analyses indicated
significant, independent, indirect effects of collective narcissism,
right wing authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation
on support for the referendum’s outcome via the perceived
threat of immigrants (Table 2, Figure 2). The analyses with
national attachment as a predictor instead of collective narcissism
produced a significant model, R2 = 0.41, F(4, 221) = 37.90, p <
0.001. The direct effect of national attachment on the referendum
vote was not significant, b= 0.03, SE= 0.06, 95%CI [−0.08; 0.14],
t = 0.48, p = 0.63. However, the indirect effect via the perceived
threat of immigrants was positive and significant, IE = 0.10, SE
= 0.04, 95%CI [0.04; 0.18], z = 2.99, p = 0.003. When collective
narcissism was entered as a covariate this effect became non-
significant, IE= 0.04, SE= 0.03, 95%CI [−0.02; 0.10], z= 1.19, p
= 0.23. This pattern remained unchanged after the demographic
covariates were entered into the equation (Table 2).
Relative Importance of All Predictors of Prejudice for
the Perceived Threat of Immigrants and Support for
the Referendum’s Outcome
Again, the relative importance indices analysis indicated an
independent and closely comparable contribution of collective
narcissism, right wing authoritarianism, and social dominance
orientation to explaining the variance in the perceived threat
of immigrants and a positive attitude toward the referendum’s
outcome. The relative role of national attachment was negligible
(Table 5).
DISCUSSION
The outcome of the “European referendum” on June 23,
2016 was largely unexpected. It has been explained by voter’s
age (i.e., older voters), their economic situation (i.e., poorer
voters), and education (less educated voters especially in high-
skilled areas) suggesting that the Brexit vote reflected a broader
societal division between those who embracedmodern globalized
economy and groups that were “left behind” by the economic
growth in the U.K. (Goodwin and Health, 2016). The analyses
considering individual difference predictors of the Brexit vote
pointed to voters’ cost-benefit and risk calculations, susceptibility
to influence of political elites and low feelings of attachment to
the wider international community (Clarke et al., 2016). While
these explanations provided important insights into factors that
played a role in the Brexit vote, the role of xenophobia, the
fear of foreigners, was often alluded to, but never systematically
examined, as a psychological factor behind the Brexit vote.
However, before the referendum, the Leave campaign mobilized
anxiety over the national prosperity and sovereignty being
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FIGURE 2 | Relationship between variables in Study 2. Coefficients for the binary outcome variable represent log odds [odd ratios] and standard errors are in
parentheses. Coefficients for the continuous variables represent unstandardized regression weights. Numerals in italic font correspond to analyses with covariates
(national identification, age, gender, education, ethnicity, and indicated national group). Numerals in bold font correspond to unstandardized regression weights and
standard error in analyses predicting the continuous support for the outcome of the referendum. ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01.
TABLE 5 | Comparison of relative importance of all variables in explaining variance in support for the referendum’s outcome, Study 2, N = 226.
Variables VIF Study 2 (threat of immigrants, Overall R2 = 0.43) Study 2 (support for the outcome, Overall R2 = 0.21)
Regression
weights
Dominance
weights
Relative importance
weights
Incremental
R2
Regression
weights
Dominance
weights
Relative importance
weights
Incremental
R2
Collective narcissism 1.66 0.34 0.17 0.16 0.07 0.17 0.06 0.06 0.02
National
identification/attachment
1.32 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.004 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.004
Social dominance
orientation
1.43 0.23 0.11 0.11 0.04 0.19 0.06 0.07 0.02
Right wing
authoritarianism
1.57 0.19 0.11 0.10 0.02 0.17 0.06 0.06 0.02
threatened by foreign immigration to the U.K.. The Leave
campaign framed leaving the E.U. as resurrecting the national
greatness undermined by foreign forces: the E.U. and immigrants
(Clarke et al., 2016). The present results suggest that this framing
might have addressed the concerns of people already prone to
prejudice against foreigners.
All three robust predictors of prejudice were related to the
Brexit vote and the support for the referendum’s outcome via
the perceived threat of immigrants: collective narcissism, right
wing authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation. This
suggests that, the Brexit vote was motivated by different concerns
instigating prejudice: the collective narcissistic concern regarding
the recognition of the national group’s uniqueness, authoritarian
concern regarding protection of the normative status quo, and
the concern regarding protection of the national group’s elevated
international status, relevant to people high in social dominance
orientation. The individual difference predictors of xenophobia
explained the variance in the Brexit vote and the support for the
referendum’s outcome over and above demographic predictors
such as age, ethnicity or education (frequently commented on
factors that predicted the referendum vote, Waugh, 2017).
Collective narcissism was an independent and at least equally
strong (if not stronger) predictor of the perceived threat of
immigrants and support for the referendum’s outcome as the
other robust psychological predictors of xenophobia: right wing
authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. The results
of the dominance and relative importance analyses suggested
that the contribution of the three variables to explaining the
variance in the perceived threat of immigrants and the support
for the referendum’s outcome was independent and comparable
in size. These results corroborate previous findings indicating
that collective narcissism, right wing authoritarianism, and
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social dominance orientation explain negativity toward other
groups independently and for different reasons (Golec de Zavala
et al., 2009, 2013b, 2016). Thus, the present results indicated
that collective narcissism should be considered as an equally
important and stable individual difference predictor of bigotry,
as right wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation.
The present results also suggested that collective narcissism
should be considered as a predictor of political behavior at
least as important as right wing authoritarianism and social
dominance orientation. Previous studies that considered this
variable in the context of voting indicated that it predicted
voting for Donald Trump in the Presidential election in the
U.S. over and above right wing authoritarianism. This suggest
that predictor of prejudice play a role in another voting for
a candidate whose political campaign stirred anti-immigrant
sentiments.
To the best of our knowledge, the present results are the
first to demonstrate that all three predictors of xenophobia
are related to the rejection of the superordinate group that
would undermine the strength of the boundaries between the
national ingroup and outgroups, i.e., citizens of the E.U.. These
results corroborate previous findings pointing to the limited
enthusiasm for the E.U. among those who identify strongly as
British (e.g., Cinnirella, 1997; Cinnirella and Hamilton, 2007).
However, the current results qualify previous findings indicating
that it is collective narcissism that predicts lower support
for the E.U., rather than national identification or national
attachment. National identification (how important it is for
people to be members of the national group) and national
attachment (how attached and positive people feel about their
national groups) were not related to rejection of immigrants,
the Brexit vote or the support for the referendum’s outcome
after their overlap with other three predictors was controlled for.
The results are especially interesting with reference to national
attachment, which predicted the perceived threat of immigrants
when analyses did not control for its overlap with collective
narcissism. This suggests that national attachment may explain
the perceived threat of immigrants but only in as much as
it is related to collective narcissism. These results corroborate
previous findings suggesting that collective narcissism is
a distinct form of ingroup positivity that systematically
predicts intergroup hostility in the context of intergroup threat
(Golec de Zavala, in press).
Specifically, previous studies showed that in contrast to
other forms of ingroup positivity (such as collective self-esteem,
positive ingroup identification, or constructive patriotism)
collective narcissism was reliably related to negative attitudes
and hostility toward outgroups. In addition, controlling
for the overlap between collective narcissism and ingroup
attachment allowed the latter to emerge as a predictor
of outgroup tolerance (Golec de Zavala et al., 2013a). In
previous studies, non-narcissistic (statistically freed from
the overlap with collective narcissism) ingroup attachment
did not predict hypersensitivity to intergroup threat (Golec
de Zavala et al., 2016) and was not related to conspiracy
beliefs about Jews or siege mentality (Golec de Zavala
and Cichocka, 2012). The present results go beyond such
findings, indicating that only collective narcissism, but not
national identification or national attachment, was related to
rejection of immigrants to the U.K. and support for the Brexit
vote.
In the present research the common variance was removed
from all relevant concepts: collective narcissism, national
identification, and national attachment but also social dominance
orientation and right wing authoritarianism. Partialling out the
common variance can create problems with interpreting the
residual variables (Lynam et al., 2006). In order to prevent
this problem we followed the steps prescribed by the above
mentioned authors. We used validated and highly reliable scales
(internal consistencies ranged from 0.78 to 0.97) and analyzed
mediation relationships in our data. We used variables that
are theoretically differentiable and generally well-understood
as distinct constructs. Right wing authoritarianism and social
dominance orientation have been differentiated as submissive
vs. dominant facets of authoritarianism. They were related to
different outcomes and have different antecedents (Duckitt, 2006;
Sibley et al., 2007a,b). They were also clearly differentiated
from national attitudes (Osborn et al., 2017). Similarly, previous
research showed that feeling proud and satisfied to be a member
of a valuable group is psychologically distinct from collective
narcissism. While collective narcissism and non-contingent in-
group positivity may quite often coexist, they seem to refer
to different psychological realities (Golec de Zavala, in press).
Non-narcissistic ingroup positivity was related to high self-
esteem, whereas collective narcissism was associated with low
self-esteem via vulnerable narcissism (Golec de Zavala, in press).
Ingroup positivity, with collective narcissism partialled out, can
be interpreted as a confident positive evaluation of the ingroup,
independent of external recognition and resilient to threats and
criticism. Collective narcissism, with ingroup positivity partialled
out, can be interpreted as group-based entitlement without the
comfort of the sense of belonging to a valuable group (Golec de
Zavala, in press).
Our interpretation of the present findings can be based
on the raw variables because partialling their common
variance did not increase or change the direction of their
zero-sum associations with the mediators and outcomes
(except of the already discussed case of national attachment).
Finally, we used the dominance and relative importance
analyses to determine the relative contribution of correlated
predictors to explaining the variance in the mediator and
the outcome variables. Such an approach increases our
confidence that our results present distinct contributions of
the predictors of prejudice to explaining the variance in the
perceived threat of immigrants and support for the Brexit
vote.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Although, the present studies provide novel insights into the
individual level variables related to support for the E.U. in
the UK, they are not without limitations. Although, the results
were obtained on sample that are large enough to reveal
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stable correlations, those results are not representative. The
sampling was opportunistic and resulted in a sample with
majority of voters who chose the “Remain” option. However,
the fact that the results were remarkably consistent across two
different samples of British adults increases our confidence in
generalizability of our findings. Another limitation may be the
fact that the mediator and the continuous variable were quite
strongly correlated. However, we performed similar mediation
analyses with a binary outcome variable (i.e., participants vote in
the referendum). The results of those analyses closely matched
the results obtained with the continuous outcome variable
i.e., the support for the referendum’s outcome. Nevertheless,
the results are correlational and cross-sectional. They do not
allow for firm causal inferences or firm inferences regarding
directionality of the effects. However, we provide theoretical
reasons to justify that it is likely that psychological predictors of
prejudice should be related to the rejection of immigrants and
political choices rather than the other way around. In addition,
most research in the social sciences confirm the direction of
causality assumed in the tested model, suggesting that broader
ideological orientations and basic ingroup identification (such as
right wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and
collective narcissism) constrain specific beliefs and actions, such
as the perceived threat of immigrants, the vote in the referendum
and support for the referendum’s outcome (rather than vice versa;
see e.g., De Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003; Cohrs et al., 2005;
Duckitt, 2006).
Arguably, different causation could also be plausible.
Collective narcissism, right wing authoritarianism, and social
dominance orientation might have predicted the Brexit vote
and support for the referendum’s outcome that strengthen the
perceived rejection of immigrants. We tested such alternative
mediation models (with the support for the referendum’s
outcome entered as a continuous mediator and the perceived
threat of immigrants as the outcome variable). The fit to the
data was worse in comparisons to the models we proposed and
tested. In addition, the alternative models showed inconsistent
relationships in Study 1 and 2. In Study 1, the indirect effects
via the support for the referendum’s outcome to the perceived
threat of immigrants were significant for collective narcissism
and right wing authoritarianism but not for social dominance
orientation. Those effects were weaker than the effects in the
models we proposed. In Study 2, the reverse indirect effect
was not significant for collective narcissism. Nevertheless, the
cross-sectional nature of the present data is not optimal for
testing mediation models and future studies would do well to
examine collective narcissism, right wing authoritarianism, and
social dominance orientation as predictors of political behavior
in panel designs assessing predictors and mediators at different
times.
CONCLUSIONS
We argue that our analyses offer a novel perspective on the
Brexit vote and the support for the referendum’s outcome. They
indicate that psychological predictors of xenophobia were related
to the rejection of the U.K.’s membership in the European Union.
Understanding whether prejudice motivated the Brexit vote or
the Brexit vote legitimized and increased prejudice may be of
lesser importance than understanding that individual predictors
of prejudice are related to political choices that undermine
diversity and harmonious intergroup relations. The mobilization
of xenophobic sentiments around Brexit also suggests that, at
least to some extent, this political choice was motivated by
affect rather than rational consideration of collective costs and
benefits. The present results suggest that at least three categories
of concerns that go beyond cost-benefit and risk calculations are
relevant to the Brexit process: undermined national uniqueness
(concern associated with collective narcissism), the threatened
traditional status quo (concern associated with right wing
authoritarianism), and threatened international status (concern
associated with social dominance orientation). Whether those
concerns should be given precedence over the country’s welfare
and internal stability is the subject of ongoing political
debates.
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